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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN,
Plaintiffs and
Cross-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 16416

BAILEY BIRD and VIRGINIA
BIRD,
Defendants and
Cross-Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a cross appeal by Cross-Appellants (Bird) from
that part of the declaratory judgment below interpreting provisions
of a written lease executed in 1961 between the parties and holding
Bird has no rights whatsoever in certain of lessees'

(Stevensen)

property located near leasehold property subject to such lease.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the court which found Stevensen had
the power under the lease to arrange the parking on the leasehold
property so long as he complied with the other provisions of the
lease ana round that Stevensen could relocate the accessway to
such parking to any convenient location including its original locaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion on Goddard Court.

The court below also found that the lease

did not grant any right whatsoever to Bird in Stevensen's property
and held that Stevensen could remove the accessway and the parking
stalls reserved and used by Bird from separate property owned by
Stevensen to their original locations on the leasehold property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Cross .. Respondents (Stevensen) seek affirmance of that portion of the Declaratory Judgment below, its Findings of Fact and

I

Conclusions of Law, pertaining to the parking area of the leasehold
property, Stevensen's separate property and to the provisions of

I

I

I

the lease concerned with the parking arrangement thereon.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cross-Respondents dispute the statement of facts

contain~

in Cross-Appellants' brief and therefore submits the following
statement of facts:
1.

In 1961 Cross-Appellants (Bird) and Cross-Respondents

(Stevensen) entered into a lease of the upper two floors of the
premises located at 251 and 253 East 200 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, the parking area to the rear of the building at said address
(to the north of the lessors' buildings) and the alley way l0.84
feet wide to the east of such buildings (the alley way is also knowr.
as Goddard Court).

(Plaintiff Exhibit "P-1").

See plat attached

hereto as Exhibit "A".
2.

The lease between Stevensen and Bird is Exhibit "P-1"

and provides in pertinent part as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(a)

Paragraph 5 of the lease on page 4 grants Stevensen

the right to grade and blacktop the parking area and to mark
and designate the same for the parking of motor vehicles.
Paragraph 5 also reserves the first 26 parking stalls which
can be entered on the leasehold property by Bird and his
tenants.
(b)

Paragraph 7 provides as follows:

Lessee shall have the right during the
term of this lease or any extension thereof,
to relocate the accessway to the rear of
Lessors' buildings from its present location,
Goddard Court, to any other convenient location, provided only that Lessee shall at all
times make available a suitable and adequate
access to the rear of Lessors' buildings and
shall keep a lane of traffic available for
smooth and efficient inflow and outflow of
traffic to the ramp at the rear of Lessors'
buildings . . • Lessee shall so arrange the
parking area as to not unnecessarily interfere
with the efficient and proper use of the loading
facilities as now established at the rear of
Lessors' buildings.
(c)

Paragraph 10 of the lease provides as follows:

Lessors convenant that Lessees shall have
the quiet enjoyment of the premises demised
herein and shall have the right to, at Lessees'
own expense, construct fences or other suitable
boundary markers to limit the parking area • . .
Stevensen had previously acquired Lorenzo Smith & Sons

3.

property just east of Goddard Court to facilitate expansion of his
athletic club facilities which included a right of way over Goddard
Court (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1", R.243)
Exhibit "A".
4.

See plat attached as

(This property was referred to below as the Smith property).
Prior to the lease and for the first few years thereafter,
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-4Bird and his tenants parked behind his buildings on the leasehold
property.

(Defendants' Exhibits 12, 13, and 14; R.240)

5.

Over a period of three years after execution of the

lease, Stevensen constructed a

swimming pool facility on the north

portions of the Smith property and the leasehold property, he razed
Lorenzo Smith & Sons buildings, and he graded and blacktopped
the leasehold property and the remaining portion of the Smith
propertyforparking and access.

(R.243-44)

After improvements,

Stevensen moved some of Bird's parking from the rear of his buildings onto the Smith property to meet needs existing at that time.
(R. 240, 251)

6.

Thereafter, Stevens en used portions of the Smith prop-

erty and a small portion of the Bird leasehold property for athletic
club facilities and has used the remaining portion of the Smith
property and most of the Bird leasehold property for various
parking arrangements as needed or required by various circumstances
existing in the area from time to time.
7.

(R.

303, 308, 309, and 311

As the downtown business area grew and construction of

improvements on real property limited the availability of parking
in the immediate area, disputes over parking and particular locatioi
between Stevensen, Bird, Bird's tenants, and their patrons grew to
the point where such disputes were a regular occurrence jeopardizin,
persons and property in the area.

(Bird, et al v. Stevensen, T.51,

58, 92, 94, and 95)

8.

Stevensen, as lessee of the leasehold property, att~~

to resolve the parking problems as they developed to facilitate
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management of the parking, but was prevented from doing so by the
lack of cooperation of Bird, his other tenants, and their patrons.
(Bird, et al. v. Stevensen, T.57, 58, 92, 94, and 95)
9.

Stevensen determined that the solution to the parking

difficulties was to separate access to the parking from the street
entrance at Second South so patrons entering either the leasehold
or Stevensen's property would know at the point of entrance where
they were permitted to park.

Such separation would necessitate

relocating Bird's parking stalls and accessway from Stevensen's
separate property arranging them on the leasehold property, but would
not diminish the number of parking stalls or the accessway.

(Bird,

et al. v. Steve41sen, T.95)
10.

As Stevensen began to exercise his powers under the

lease and attempted to alter the parking arrangement, confrontation
continued between himself and Bird resulting in the present action
for declaratory relief to interpret the lease and declare the
rights of the parties in such lease so that Stevensen could
rearrange the parking and alleviate the parking problems.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION
INTERPRETING THE LEASE TO GIVE
STEVENSEN THE POWER TO ARRANGE PARKING,
ERECT FENCES AND RELOCATE THE ACCESSWAY IS THE CORRECT DECISION
BECAUSE THE LEASE IS CONTROLLING.
It is commonly accepted that a lease must be construed with
reference to the intentions of the parties.

Powerine Co. v. Russell's
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Inc., 135 P.2d 906 (1943).

In finding the intent of the parties

the terms of the lease, however expressed, if unambiguous, are to
control the construction and operation of the lease.
Landlord-Tenants§ 232(2).

51 CJS,

Consequently, the clear and

unambigoo~

language of the lease is controlling and the lower court's construetion of the agreement in this case is proper.
In clear and unambiguous language the 1961 lease grants
Stevensen the right to rearrange the parking configuration on leasehold property and to erect fences to facilitate management of the
parking area.

Paragraph 5 of the lease permits Stevensen to

blacktop the leasehold and mark it for parking so long as an adequate access is maintained and 26 parking stalls are reserved for
the Lessor.

Paragraph 7 grants Stevensen the right to relocate

the accessway to any convenient location, and paragraph 10 gives
Stevensen the "right to erect fences and other suitable boundary
markers to limit the parking area."
The lower court's judgment is consistent with the express
terms of the agreement.

By confirming Stevensens' right to erect

fences on the leasehold property and by confirming Stevens ens' righ
to rearrange the parking and accessways to the original configurations the court has reached the proper decision required by the
lease.
POINT II
CROSS-APPELLANTS AND THEIR TENANTS DO
NOT HAVE A RIGHT IN STEVENSENS' SEPARATE
PROPERTY BECAUSE THE LEASE GRANTS NO SUCH RIGHT.
Prior to execution of the Stevensen-Bird lease in 1961,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-7and at all times subsequent thereto, Stevensen has owned property
adjoining Goddard Court on the east (Goddard Court being 10.84
foot right of way running north and south directly east of Birds'
building), and a 1/2 interest in the 10.84 foot right of way
over Goddard Court.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1", R.243)

By the

1961 lease, Stevensen acquired from Bird the other 1/2 interest in
the right of way over Goddard Court.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1")

Nowhere in the 1961 lease or anywhere else has Stevensen
granted to Bird a right in his property.

Nevertheless, Cross-

Appellants argue that Stevensen is prevented from relocating the
parking and accessway thus requiring Stevensen to utilize his own
property for Cross-Appellants' parking and Cross-Appellants' access
to their parking.

Such argument is contrary to reason and law.

The court below specifically held in paragraph 6(a) of
the Conclusions of Law as follows; "The lease does not grant
defendants any right or interest in the Smith property".

(R.189)

The lower court's judgment granting Stevensen the power to arrange the
parking, relocate the accessway, and erect a fence to separate the
parking also recognizes that Cross-Appellants have no right in the
Stevensen property referrea to as the Smith ?roperty.

The pertinent

portion of the Judgment is as follows:
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a
declaratory judgment declaring the meaning of the lease
between plaintiffs and defendants to grant plaintiffs the
right to rearrange the parking configuration and also to
move all parking from the Smith property to the rear of
Lessors' buildings so long as plaintiffs comply with the
other provisions of the lease between the parties.
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2. The lease between the parties authorizes plaintiffs
to relocate the accessway extending from Second South to
the rear of defendants' buildingsto any convenient location
including its original location within the confines of
Goddard Court so long as the plaintiffs comply with the
other provisions of the lease between the parties.
3. The lease between the parties authorizes
plaintiffsto erect fences which limit and define the parking areas and access thereto so long as plaintiffs comply
with the other provisions of the lease between the
parties.
(R.183-84)
POINT III
THE COURSE OF DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
WAS NOT AN ISSUE TRIED BELOW AND CANNOT BE
RAISED ON APPEAL BY CROSS-APPELLANTS.
Cross-Appellants did not plead, submit evidence on, or
argue the issue of the course of dealing between the parties in the
trial below and such issue cannot be raised now on appeal.
v. Smith, 313 P.2d 465 (Utah 1957).

Radley

The issues below involve

the interpretation of the lease and not the course of dealing
between the parties.
In addition, Cross-Appellants seek to create an ambiguity
in the written terms of the lease where none exists.

I f there is no

I

ambiguity, the lease itself controls. Denver Plastics, Inc. v.
Snyder, 416 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1966) .
There is no arnbigui ty in the provisions of the lease which
leaves any doubt that Stevensen has the power to erect fences to
limit the parking especially where such fences are on his own
property.

(See pazagraph 10 of plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1")

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Certainly any convenient location includes its original location
on Goddard Court.
There is no ambiguity in the lease which can be construed
to create a right or interest in Cross-Appellants to the separate
property of Stevensen.

(See plaintiffs' Exhibit "P-1")

Stevensen

has not given Bird a right in his property and no course of dealing between them can create such a right.
There is certainly no ambiguity in the lease as to Stevensens' power and right to arrange the parking on the leasehold
property a fortiori when such arrangement is to remove the parking
from his property.
Cross-Appellants seek to create an issue of law on appeal
which was not tried below based on ambiguities that do not exist.
Such is clearly improper and a telling point is that Cross-Appellants'
arguments are based on no argument, fact, or pleading cited to
this court in the record below.
In addition, if the course of dealing between the parties
shows anything, it is that the parking arrangement has been changed
several times and that Stevensen has the authority to change the
parking as the conditions require.

(R.303, 308, 309, and 312)

POINT IV
THE LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS IT CONCERNS THE
LOCATION OF THE PARKING ARRANGEMENT AND THE
LOCATION OF THE ACCESSWAY THERETO HAS NOT BEEN
MODIFIED AND WAS NOT SO HELD BY THE COURT BELOW.
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-10The court's Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment below
do not hold that defendants' Exhibit "D-4", the 1975 description of
parking stalls, was a modification of the lease nor would such
ing be correct.

hol~

In effect, the court below ruled that Stevensen

has the power, independent of the lease, to remove parking reserved by the lease between the parties from his separate property
to the leasehold property.
Defendants' Exhibit "D-4" cannot be a modification of the
lease as to the arrangement of parking stalls and the location of
access because by its own terms, it is simply an agreement on the
assignment of stalls to Cross-Appellants' tenants as of a particular date.

The language on the bottom portion of Exhibit "D-4" is

as follows:
This rough sketch is made again at the
instance of Ted Stevensen, Midtown Auto Parts,
and Church of Scientology to show stalls assigned
to various tenants.
Each tenant will be given
a copy of the sketch.
Thus, the Exhibit by its own terms was to clear up confusion as
to which parking stalls were assigned to the various tenants as of
a particular date.

It was not to modify the lease as to Stevensens' /

right to relocate the access and parking stalls entirely from his I

I

separate property.
Such a modification would also require explicit unambiguous language which Exhibit "D- 4" does not con a tin.
Jones, 211 P. 2d 283

(OKLA. 19 49).

Popplewel~

In addition, Cross-Appellants ha:I

not shown mutual assent or consideration for the modification.

I
I
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Bamberger Prodictions v. Certified Productions, 48 P.2d 489
(Utah 1935) .
POINT V
THE DECISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN KATSANEVAS V. STEVENSEN, CIVIL NO. 226232
IS NOT RES JUDICATA OF THE ISSUES TRIED BELOW
NOR DOES SUCH DECISION HAVE THE FAR REACHING EFFECT
ARGUED BY THE CROSS-APPELLANTS.
Cross-Appellants have misapplied the principle of res
judicata when they argue that the decision in Katsanevas v. Stevensen,
Third District Court, Civil No. 226232, bars the decision of the
lower court in the present appeal.

The principle of res judicata is

only available when a judgment on the merits of a court of competant
jurisdiction determines identical rights, facts, or issues between
the same parties or their privies.

Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044

(Utah 1971); Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1949).
The Katsanevas case was between Cross-Respondent Stevensen

s'

and Steve and Mike Katsenavas, two of Cross-Appellants' lessees.

I

Cross-Appellants were not parties to that case and have not obtained

l

nor have they been conveyed any right in such case.
~atsanevas

The issue of the

case was whether Stevensen had the right to certain of

the 26 reserved parking stalls when such were "untenanted" as defined

\

by the lease.

The provisions of the lease between Stevensen and Bird

covering Stevensens' powers to arrange parking and relocate the
accessway were not at issue nor was the location or particular
h''

arrangement of any particular parking stalls an issue.

The issue

I
II
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-12of Stevensens' right to erect fences was also not an issue.
Thus, the parties being different had the issues being
different, the principles of res judicata do not apply to bar the
lower court decision.
Cross-Appellants own argument best illustrates the weakness
of their position when he argues on page 11 of his brief that,
Lessee remains under a permanent injunction from
the Court from rearraging the parking on the
leased premises unless Lessee can demonstrate to
the court an extreme good cause for doing so.
(Emphasis added) .
Even if Judge Sawaya's order in Katsanevas v. Stevensen affected
the arrangement of the parking on the leasehold premises in some
way, such order does not prevent Stevensen from removing the 26

I

reserved parking stalls and the accessway from his own separate .

I

property.

To state that the Katsanevas order and the lease requires
-

I

Stevensen to provide Bird and his tenants with parking on Stevensens''
own property is unfounded in fact, unfounded in the law, and unfounded in reason.
On several occasions in the trial below, counsel for

Cros~

Appellants argued that Katsanevas v. Stevensen prevented Stevensen
from rearranging the parking.

I

I

(R.171, 205, 206, 221, 377, and 378

referring to opposition to Steven sens' motion for Summary Judgment!
Certainly if Judge Taylor were required to find extreme

g~od

1

cause, r

he did so by implication in his Findgins of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment.
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-13CONCLUSION
That portion of the lower court decision relating to
Stevensens' powers to arrange the parking, relocate the accessway
and erect fences should be affirmed because such powers are
clearly found in the lease and because in any event Stevensens
can remove such stalls and accessway from their separate property
and erect a fence on the property line.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of January, 1980.
WATKINS & FABER

~~/~JI{;(,~~
l'w~ER

P. FABER, JR.
MICHAEL A. NEIDER
BARRE G. BURGON
Attorneys for PlaintiffsCross-Respondents
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
363-4491
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